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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HELEN C. EMERY, as guardian ad
litem for Brent Wesley Varley, Patrick
J. Varley and .Mark Robert Varley,
minors; and CHRISTINE VARLEY,

Plaintiffs-A.ppellan].s,

vs.
TI-IE STATE OF UTAH, a sovereign,
an<l JOHN DOE; whose true names are
unknown, agents and employees of the
State of Utah at the Utah State Hospital,

Case No.
12173

Defendants-Respondents.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from the entry of a summary
judgment dismissing appellants' complaint. Appellants
brought an action for wrongful death against the State
of Utah and its agents and employees of the Utah State
Hospital, wherein it was claimed that appellants' decedent died as a result of negligent and improper care and

I

treatment while a voluntary patient at the Utah State

IJospitaJ. ', ··· "-·-·

:OISPOSITION IN LO-WER COURT
After the filing of appellants' wrongful death action, the responqents in their
alleged a lack of
jurisdiction on the ground that the State and its agents
are immune, through gover:µrnental immunity, from suit.
a motion to strike those
of the
Appellants
answer interposing this defense. The. trial- court denied
appellants' motion to. strike and granted respondents'
motion for a summary judgment of dismissal.

,

RELIEF SOUGlIT ON +\_PPEAL
The appellants seek a reversal of' the summary
judgment of dismissal, -and an order remanding this
case to the Thµ-d Judicial Dist:rict for further proceedmgs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Arta

Varley, the deceased daughter of apvellant, Helen C. Emery, and deceased mother of appellant Christine Varley, on the 7th day of August,
1968 made application to the Utah State Hospital for
treatment. The application (Exhibit 1-P) sets forth the
essentiai facts surrounding the circumstances of her admission. Doctors R. Jan- Stout and Peter L. Nielsen>
I

,
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'

'

1

psychiatrists in private practice in Salt Lake City,
signed the application for admission.
two

On August 9, 1968, the decedent sustained a serious
head injury while a patient at the Utah State Hospital
following her admission. The nature of the injury required her transfer from her treatment facility to the
medical-surgical ward of the Utah State Hospital.
Early on August 10, 1968, the extent of the injury suffered by Mrs. Varley lead to her transfer to the UniYersity of Utah :Medical Center at Salt Lake City. l\Irs.
Varley died following unsuccessful surgery on August
10, 1968. On November 14, 1968, a claim was filed
with the State of Utah claiming $300,000 damages
(R. 12). This claim was filed pursuant to the Utah Governmenal Immunities Act [U.C.A. 63-30-1 et. seq.
(Repl. Vol. 1965)]. No action was taken by the respondents on the claim and, pursuant to the applicable statutes, appellants, having deemecl their claim denied, filed
a Complaint in the instant action alleging that the
juries resulting in Mrs. Vadey's death were caused by
the negligent, careless and wrongful activities or
sions of the agents and employees of the State of Utah.
The State alleged iµ its answer a defense of sovereign
immunity (R. 16) stating that "plaintiff's claim is
barred by the provisions of Section 63-30-1 O( 1 O) in that
decedent was incarcerated in the Utah State Hospital."
U.C.A. 63-30-10(10) provides that immunity from
suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any
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employee committed within the scope of his employment,
except if the injury:
". . . ( 10) arises out of the incarceration of any
person in any state prison, county or city jail or
other place of legal confinement ... "
The appellants filed a motion to strike the portion
of the respondents' answer wherein the respondents
claim that the action was barred by sovereign immunity (R. 18). On the 31st day of March, 1970, the
attorneys for the parties appeared before Judge Hall
and
the motion to strike. In connection with the
arguments, memoranda of authority were submitted
by both parties (R. 29-32, 33-38). The trial court denied
appellants' motion to strike and upon motion of counsel
for the respondents a summary judgment was entered
on the 11th day of June, 1970. This summary judgment stated that "it appears to the court-upon the pleadings; admissions and arguments of the parties that the
Utah ·State l!ospital is an institution of legal confinement and that plaintiffs' decedent was confined therein
at ·the. time of. the trauma which ultilnately :resulted
in her death. The statute involved herein in such case;
cannot, therefore,· be construed to waive the defense of
sovereign immunity; . . . " ( }l. 39) .
'

It

from the entry_ of that j:udgment that avpellants bring this appeal.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TI-IE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL
'
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF DECEDENT'S ADl\IISSION, WAS A PLACE OF
LEGAL CONFINEl\iENT AND THAT Il\IMUNITY FROM SUIT HAD NOT BEEN
WAIVED.
ARGUMENT
The circumstances of the admission is determinative
of a finding that an institution constitutes a place of
legal confinement under the Utah Governmental Immunities Act.
The statutes provide five ways by which persons
may be admitted to the Utah State Hospital. Two of
the procedures a:re non-emergency in nature, while
three of them are procedures of an emergency nature.
Of the non-emergency .procedures, U.(;.A. 64-7-29
(RepL Vol. 1968) provides for voluntary applicatiOn by
the individual and acceptance for treatment by the superintendent of tpe Utap State Hospital. That statute
provides:
"The superintendent of the Utah State Hospital
may admit for observation, diagnosis, care and
treatment any individual who is mentally ill or
has symptoms of mental illness and who, being
16 years or over, applies therefor, and any individual under 1G years of age who is pientally ill
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or has symptoms of mental illness, if a parent or
legal guardian applies therefor in his behalf."
[U.C.A. 64-7-29 (Repl. Vol. 1968)).
The language of this section originates with the
National Institute of Mental Health, Federal Security
Agency, Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill (Public Health Service Pub., No. 51,
1951). Although the Federal Draft Act states that subject to the availability of suitable accommodations the
head of a public hospital shall admit voluntary applicants, the change from the imperative to the permissive
in Utah's.case should not be determinative of the factors
urged on this appeal. (See Branch, Utah's Experience
with the National Draft A.ct for Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 109 Am. J. Psych. 336 (1952)}.
The other non-emergency procedure for admitting
patients to the Utah State Hospital is the standard non·
judicial hospitalization procedure which, also taken from
the Federal Draft Act, authorizes the hospitalization
by the superintendent of persons upon the written application of individuals in specific relationship to the pro·
posed patient; The application, however, must be accom·
panied by· a certificate signed by two designated examiners· stating that the individual is mentally ill and
either dangerous to himself or others, or that he is in need
of care or treatment in a mental hospital and further,
because of his incapacity, this individual lacks the insigh't to make a responsible application therefor.
[U.C.A. 64-7-33 (A) (l) (Repl. Vol. 1968) J. The three
procedures
an exercise of the police
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po,ver to restrain dangerously ill individuals, not mYolved in the instant case.
Exhibit 1-P contains copies of the admission sheets
of the Utah State Hospital which were, for the most
part, filled out at the time the decedent entered the
State facility. The second page of the exhibit is purported to be an "Application for Admission to the Utah State
Hospital (Standard Non-Judicial Procedure, 85-7-59
(sic.) Laws of Utah, 1951) ." The application form further contains the certificate of the "designated examiners", Doctors R. Jan Stout and Peter N. Nielsen. It
is interesting to note that the application is signed by the
decedent, Mrs. Varley.
As previously noted under the standard non-Judicial
procedure, any individual may be admitted to the Utah
State Hospital upon written application of a friend,
relative, spouse, or guardian of the individual, a health
or public welfare or peace officer or the head of any
institution in which such individual may bt;. [U.C.A.
64-7-33(A) (1) (Repl. Vol. 1968)}. This section furthtr states that there be certificatioll: by two designated
exam.mers.
Of the five procedures available for admission,
there is only one procedure under which the persons
seeking care and treatment at the ho$pltal can themselves make application for such care and treatment.
That is the voluntary procedure as set forth in U.C.A.
04-7 .. 29 (Repl. Vol. 1968).
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Notwithstanding the misleading use of a standard
non-judicial procedure form for lVIrs. Varley's hospitalization, and notwithstanding the completely superfluous
and incomplete certification by the two Salt Lake City
psychiatrists, Doctors Stout and Nielsen, it is clear that
Mrs. Varley was accepted as a voluntary patient and
as such was entitled to the rights and protections given
her by Sections 64-7-30 and 64-7-31, U.C.A. (Repl.
Vol. 1968).
The last cited section states:
"A voluntary patient who requests his release or
whose release is requested, in writing, by his legal
guardian, parent, spouse, or adult next-of-kin,
shall be releMed forthwith except that,
(I) If the patient was admitted on his own application and the request for release is made by a
person other than the patient, release may be
·conditioned upon the agreement of the patient
thereto, and . ...

( 3) Jf the superintendent of tpe hospital, within
the
files with
the District Court or a judge thereof a certification that· in his opinion the relase of the patient
· would be unsafe for- the patient or others, release
may be postponed on application for as Jong
the court or judge thereof determine to be necessary for
commencement of proceedings for
judicial hospitalization, but in no event for more
thaii five days, provided that judicial
for hospitalization shall not be commenced with
respect to a voluntary patient unless release of
the patient has. been requested by himself or the
individual who applied for his admission." (Emadded.)
48 hours
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Nothing is contained in the record indicating a
request from Mrs. Varley for her release nor is there
an indication that any other person had requested her
release or, that even assuming such a written request,
that the superintendent of the hospital, in a timely manner, filed a certificate to postpone Mrs. Varley's release.
The decedent, Arta Geann Varley, voluntarily
admitted herself to the State Hospital and was accepted
for care and treatment. By virtue of the statutes governing the procedures at the Utah State Hospital Mrs.
Varley could have, at her written request, been released
forthwith.
The problem then becomes one of discovering the
true intent and meaning of the legislative words withholding jurisdiction for an injury which " . : . arises
out of the incarceration of any person in any state
prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement . . . ". _[U.C.A. 64-30-10(10). (Repl. V?)·
1968) ] . It must_ be
that the_
waiver of sovereign immunity in
here
tht'.!
result. 9f thought£ ul c011sideratio11 and
the. excep ..
tiuns to the waiver refiect
policy.
By the nature of government; a state must engage
in activities which by their nature create large -amounts
of risk. Operating jails and prisons is that type of activity. Clearly the legislature has not waived ·its· immunity in cases arising ou't of the assault of ·one inmate
upon another at the State Prison. [Sheffield vs. Turner;
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21 U.2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 ( 1968) J. Cases such as
prison stabbings, riots, and similar circumstances are
clearly within the exception created by subparagraph
IO of U.C.A. 63-30-10; however, it is only reasonable
to regard certain institutions as having multiple uses
and multiple characteristics for the purposes of interpreting that subparagraph. The appellants here urge
that the Utah State Hospital is of such a character that
depending upon the circumstances of admission and
circumstances of continued custody and treatment an
individual may or may not be in a place of legal confinement. The clear case of the State Hospital being
a place of legal confinement would be the individual
servipg a commitment to the state prison at the Utah
State Hospital pursuant to the transfer procedures
provided in the Utah Code. These procedures provide
that the Division of Corrections may order the transfer
to the Utah State Hospital of any person who has been
committed to the state prison, or upon order of the Governor, when an evaluation of the treatment needs of
such a person, given the available ·facilities at the Utah
State Hospital, indicate that such transfer would be
in the interest of such person. Any person transferred
pursuant to those provisions remains under the jurisdiction of the Utah State frison with the Utah State
Hospital acting solely as the agent of the prison.
[U.C.A. 64-9-2 (Repl. Vol. 1968)} as amended U.CA.
64-9 ..3.l (Supp. 1969)}. Those circumstaqces as con·
templated by the above cited statute are completely
alien 'to the activities, to the intent, and to the circum·
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stances of the decedent's admission. :Mrs. Varley
entered the Utah State Hospital of her own volition,
signed the application, and submitted herself to the
care and treatment of the state personnel at the hospital
as one would in any private medical facility or hospital.
Mrs. Yarley certainly enjoyed the status of one who
could be released upon her application. To argue
that the superintendent of the State Hospital was empowered by statute to resist and postpone this release
would be to engage in speculation outside the ambit of
the record in this case.
Appellants urge that these voluntary procedures
were instituted because it is felt that patients who enter
treatment facilities voluntarily, and are permitted to
regulate their time of treatment, come to the facility
with attitudes which lend themselves to more successful
relationships between the patient and staff. As stated
in a Utah Law Review article:
.

.

-

"Regarding release of patients admitted volun..
tarily, the Utah statute provides that upon the
patient's own request, he is to be released-"fm-th.;
with" subject to certain exceptiolls.- The-most im-:
portant exception is the powe_r of the
superintendent to apply to the district court for a
delay of release and commencenient _of judicfal
commitment proceedings if the- snperintendent
thinks that discharge would be dangenms for. th€
patient or for others. It seems plausible that to
encourage the use of voluntary procedures, patients need reassurance that they will be
upon their own demand·. On the other hand, the
hospital staff may be unhappy -about
q.is . .
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charge provisions since the patient, for possibly
irrational reasons, may decide to cease treatment
which the doctor feels he should have. A coolmgoff period would reduce this possibility. Moreover, there is some chance that under the liberal
procedure a dangerous individual could be returned to society if the hospital authorities hesitated too long in initiating involuntary commitment proceedings. However, it is questionable
how real this danger is, and to be consistent, it
must be conceded that if an individual is sufficiently responsible to decide to enter the hospital,
·he should also be considered sufficiently responsible to decide to leave. Accordingly, the Utah
statute offers greater protection to the rights o±
the individual." A. R. Thurman, Hospitalization
of t;he Mentally Ill in Utah: Utah Law Review,
223 (1966)'

It cannot be said that Mrs. Varley was confined
as a result of any legal process. There is no indication
nor has the claim been made that her stay in the Utah
State Hospital was the result of adjudication upon any
emergency involuntary commitment procedure, or the
result of any type of apprehen.sion, confinement or trans·
portation by sqi.te authority. The only context under
which the word "legal" enters into the circumstances of
Mrs. Varley's hospitalization is in cormection with the
availability of the voluntary procedure which is created
by state law. To say that M:rs. Varley was confined is
simply to state that her stay at the hospital had to Le
within the keeping of the rules and regulations of the
State Hospital. Mrs. Varley was a patient at will and
could termiMte her stay when she so desired. It might
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be argued that certain procedures must be complied with
prior to her release from the hospital, but the appellants simply point out that even as voluntary as a stay
in a hotel might be, certain procedures must be complied
with prior to leaving the hotel under penalty of law.
l U.C.A. 76-31-1 (Supp. 1969) J.
Appellants urge the court to find that the hospitalization of the decedent is clearly outside of the scope
of activity embraced by subparagraph 10.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE DECEDENT WAS INCARCE-

RATED.

The word "incarceration" is generally regarded to
mean
or confinement. ill a prison or· jail:
It is rarely, ·if ever, used to define hospitalization,
whether volqntary or not. Voluntary· hospitalization,
however, as in the instant case, is well beyond- any
aecepted definition of the word "incarceration".
Black's Law Dictionary (Third Edition) at page
941 defines "incarceration" as: >
confinement in a jail or penitentiary. This term is seldom used in law, .tho_ugh
found occasionally in statutes. When so used, it
appears always to meari .confinement by competent legal authority or under due legal process,
· wherea5 'imprisonment' may be effected by a
private person without warrap.t of law,_and if un·;
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justifiable is called 'false imprisonment.' No occurrence of such a phrase as 'false incarceration'
has been noted."
Ballentine's Law Dictionary (Third Edition,
1969) defines "incarceration" to mean:
"To imprison; to confine in a prison or jail."
The Oxford Dictionary of the English Language
defines "incarceration" as the action of incarcerating
or the act of being incarcerated; imprisonment. The
same authority defines "incarcerate" to mean "to shut
up in prison; to put in confinement; to imprison." A
secondary definition is to shut up as in prison; to confine. (Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 5, 1961 Reprint.)
Nothing has been suggested in this case to demon·
strate "incarceration" as required in subparagraph 10
and notwithstanding a finding to the effect that the '
Utah State Hospital was a place of legal confinement,
the absence of incarceration invalidates the defense of
sovereign immunity.

CONCLUSION
The doctrine of sovereign immunity
it applied
to the State of Utah, and its agents, was greatly modified in the Utah Government Immunities Act. It is
clear that the legislative intent which gave rise to 6330.10 (IO) was directed at penal institutions, or, in certain instances, having application to the Utah
Hos· .
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pital when it is acting as the agent of the Warden of the
Utah State Prison. The appellants qrge that the language of the exception has not been met by the
of this case. The judgment of the court below should
be reversed anq the matter remanded to the trial court
for further proceediµgs.
Respectfully sqbmitted,
Warren M. Weggeland
Gerald G. Gundry
Attorneys for the Appellants
692 Kennecott Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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